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1 Introduction/Motivation
From the onset of the Great Recession, the US labour market exhibits dynam-
ics never seen before in previous recessions. Underlying persistently high unem-
ployment is an unprecedented rise in long-term unemployment (represented by
those whose unemployment duration is greater than 6 months) as seen in Figure
1. Long-term unemployment had always been below a quarter of total unemploy-
ment apart from two occasions: the Great Recession when it represented almost
half of the total unemployment population and the early 1980s recession where it
represented a quarter of total unemployment.1
This paper investigates the impact of endogenous unemployment insurance
(UI) extensions on the dynamics of unemployment and its duration structure un-
der rational expectations using a search and matching model in general equilib-
rium. Whilst the analysis applies to cyclical fluctuations in general, the focus of
the paper is on the Great Recession, the period during which UI eligible unem-
ployed workers could receive benefits for a maximum of 99 weeks (whereas the
standard maximum UI duration is 26 weeks) as depicted in Figure 2 From the
same figure, it can be seen that the maximum UI duration has been extended in
every recession since late 1950s, and its generosity, measured by weeks of maxi-
mum UI duration, has been increasing over time (except for one extension in the
early 1980s). There are primarily two types of UI extensions in the US: (1) auto-
matic UI extensions that are in the federal laws since 1970s and are triggered by
the state (insured) unemployment rate, and (2) discretionary UI extensions that
are issued specifically during recessions.2 It is the first type that endogenises UI
extensions and makes them countercyclical.3
Based on this countercyclical UI system, I extend the standard search and
matching model to incorporate unemployment-dependent UI extensions, variable
search intensity, endogenous separations, on-the-job search, and worker’s hetero-
1Abraham, Haltiwanger, Sandusky, and Spletzer (2016) find that long-term unemployed work-
ers face worse labour market outcomes in terms of re-employment probabilities and subsequent
earnings even when controlled for individual heterogeneity.
2The automatic extensions are called extended benefits (EB) whilst the ad-hoc extensions are
under different names. For example, in 1958, the programme was called Temporary Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act (TUC), and in 1961, it was Temporary Unemployment Extended Com-
pensation Act (TEUC). From 1991 onwards, the discretionary extensions have been under the
name Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC).
3We can also see from Figure 2 that both the automatic and discretionary extensions have been
increasing in their generosity and that they are a feature of every recession since late 1950s.
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geneity in terms of productivity and benefit level. The job search decision of a
worker depends not only on their UI status, benefit level, and individual produc-
tivity but also on the aggregate productivity and the unemployment rate which
determine when and for how long UI extensions will occur.
Many empirical studies have documented how the labour market outcomes
of unemployed workers can differ with respect to their UI status. These dif-
ferences come in many forms including their unemployment duration and unem-
ployment exit rate (Moffitt and Nicholson (1982), Moffitt (1985), Katz and Meyer
(1990), Meyer (1990), Card and Levine (2000)), job search intensity (Krueger
and Mueller (2010, 2011)), and consumption (Gruber (1997)). Katz and Meyer
(1990) find a large fraction of UI recipients expect to be recalled and represent
over half of the unemployment duration in the sample. This is related to Fujita
and Moscarini (2015) who show that the recall rate rises during recessions. I pro-
vide further empirical evidence that insured unemployed workers have a lower
unemployment exit rate than the uninsured and this gap widened during the Great
Recession when UI extensions took place.
There is a large literature studying the effects of the recent UI extensions on
the unemployment exit rate and total unemployment during the Great Recession.
Empirical studies include (but not limited to) Farber and Valletta (2011), Fujita
(2011), Valletta and Kuang (2010), Aaronson, Mazumder, and Schechter (2010),
Mazumder (2011), Rothstein (2011), Barnichon and Figura (2014), and Hage-
dorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman (2019). Most of these studies focus on
the microeconomic effect of the UI extensions, namely, the impact on the prob-
ability of exiting unemployment or on the job search efforts of the unemployed.
They found a small but significant impact of UI extensions. A notable exception
is Hagedorn et al. (2019) as they take into account the response of job creation to
benefit extensions and find a larger effect on unemployment.
A benefit of using a general equilibrium model is that I can distinguish be-
tween the microeconomic and general equilibrium effects of UI extensions on
unemployment. I find that UI extensions contribute to a 0.9-1.8 percentage point
(pp) increase in unemployment under the micro effect during the Great Recession
which is consistent with existing empirical estimates.4 I find that the general equi-
4Existing estimates are in the range of 0.1-1.8pp. Fujita (2011) finds the UI extensions con-
tribute to a 0.8-1.8pp increase in the unemployment rate during the Great Recession. Aaronson
et al. (2010)’s estimates are between 0.5-1.25pp. Valetta and Kuang (2010)’s estimate is 0.4pp.
Rothstein (2011)’s estimates are between 0.1-0.5pp.
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librium effect of UI, where worker-firm match formation/separation decisions are
taken into account, is larger and similar to results from Hagedorn et al. (2019). In
this paper, however, the additional effect is from the match separation margin.5
Studies on the effects of UI extensions in general equilibrium are conducted
by Mitman and Rabinovich (2014) on jobless recoveries, Faig, Zhang and Zhang
(2016) on the volatility of unemployment and vacancies, and Nakajima (2012)
whose focus is on the Great Recession.6 The model in this paper is most similar
to that in Mitman and Rabinovich (2014) and departs from theirs in two crucial
aspects: (1) the endogeneity of UI extensions and (2) the heterogeneous job find-
ing rates.
In their model, UI extensions are exogenous and assumed to last forever (i.e.,
agents have adaptive expectations). In my model, I assume that UI extensions
are totally systematic, and agents have rational expectations regarding the tim-
ing and the length of these extensions which are governed by the unemployment
rate, just like in the US economy. Agents in my model would therefore respond
less strongly to UI extensions than in their model, in terms of both the job search
intensity and the decision to form or dissolve a match. Additionally, workers in
my model optimally choose their job search intensity whilst job search is fixed
in their model. Therefore, unemployed workers in my model have heterogeneous
job finding rates according to their UI status and benefit level whilst there is a sin-
gle job finding rate in their model. I show in the empirical section that insured and
uninsured unemployed workers do have different job finding rates. Heterogeneity
in the job finding rates is crucial in explaining the unemployment duration struc-
ture in the US labour market. Wiczer (2015) shows that a single job finding rate
implies an average unemployment duration and long-term unemployment that are
just over half of what we observed in the data. This point regarding an inadequacy
of a single job finding rate is key to the results in this paper.7
This paper also relates to the literature on the incidence of long-term unemploy-
ment and worker heterogeneity. Ahn and Hamilton (2019) use a non-linear state
space model to uncover the unobserved heterogeneity of workers’ unemployment
5Henceforth, I define job separations as employment-to-unemployment transtions.
6Nakajima (2012) studies an economy with transitional dynamics and finds that the UI exten-
sions contribute to a 1.4pp increase in the unemployment rate.
7In Rujiwattanapong (2017), I show that a single job finding rate for insured unemployed
workers hardly affects the distribution of unemployment durations. In this paper, I allow for the
job finding rates of insured unemployed workers to vary with the benefit level and individual-
specific productivity.
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exit rate. Worker heterogeneity is the focus of Hornstein (2012) in accounting for
unemployment dynamics with different durations. Ravn and Sterk (2017) con-
sider the difference in unemployment exit rates together with incomplete mar-
kets and price rigidities to study the amplification mechanism on unemployment.
Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2014) study the role of unemployed workers’ oc-
cupational mobility on the fluctuations of unemployment and its duration over
business cycles. Kroft, Lange, Notowidigdo, and Katz (2016) analyse the impact
of a genuine duration dependence in unemployment exit rate on the rise of long-
term unemployment. They find little account for the observable characteristics of
workers. Ahn (2016) extends Ahn and Hamilton (2019) to incorporate observable
characteristics of the workers (but not their UI status).
My paper considers a degree of observed and unobserved worker heterogeneity
where the former comes from the UI status and benefit level, and the latter is from
the worker’s productivity, all of which affect the job finding rate. I also estimate
the same model in Ahn and Hamilton (2019) using Maximum Likelihood and
show that their interpretation of unobserved heterogeneity is related to the UI sta-
tus in my model since insured unemployed workers have a lower unemployment
exit rate. I find that worker productivity does not matter much once the UI status
and benefit level are taken into account.
The main contributions of this paper are twofold. First, it quantifies the mi-
croeconomic and general equilibrium effects of UI extensions on unemployment
and its duration structure. Second, it demonstrates the importance of rational ex-
pectations regarding the timings of endogenous UI extensions. The framework is
useful for policy experiments to study the mechanisms through which UI exten-
sions affect the aggregate labour market.
To preview the results, I find that UI extensions account for 10-30 percent of the
rise on unemployment during the Great Recession, but the UI effect is non-linear
and of a smaller magnitude in other recessions. The main mechanism through
which UI extensions impact unemployment is the job separation margin whereas
the job search behaviour is most important for long-term unemployment. I show
that a failure to take into account rational expectations about the timing of UI
extensions implies an overestimation of unemployment by more than 2pp.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses some motivating data on
UI extensions and long-term unemployment during the Great Recession. Section
3 describes the model. Section 4 discusses the calibration exercise. Section 5
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analyses the results under the baseline model and counterfactual experiments.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
I examine the empirical evidence that (1) workers currently receiving UI bene-
fits are less likely to find a job than workers without UI, and that (2) this gap be-
tween insured and uninsured workers’ job finding rates was more pronounced dur-
ing the Great Recession. These findings are important for explaining the surge in
long-term unemployment. I study the transition rates from unemployment to em-
ployment, unemployment and out-of-labour-force (OLF) (namely UE, UU, and
UOLF rates respectively), as well as the distributions of unemployment duration
between 2006 and 2014 according to the UI status and several observable charac-
teristics of unemployed workers including age, education, gender, industry, occu-
pation, reasons for unemployment, and recall expectation. They are constructed
from the CPS Basic Monthly Data and CPS Displaced Worker, Employee Tenure,
and Occupational Mobility Supplement.8
Job findings Table 1 shows that the job finding rate of current UI recipients
is generally smaller than that of non-UI recipients, and this gap became larger
during the Great Recession. In January 2008, when there was no UI extensions,
unemployed workers with and without UI found a job at rate 21 percent and 28
percent respectively, whilst in January 2010, when the maximum UI duration was
99 weeks, the job finding rate of insured unemployed workers fell dramatically
to 7 percent, 11pp smaller than that of the uninsured unemployed. The findings
remain the same when I control for other observable worker characteristics as
shown in Table A.1 of Appendix A.9
To stay unemployed or to exit the labour force? Accompanying the drop in
job findings during the Great Recession are an increase in the UU rate and little
8I consider workers whose age is 16 years or older. Since the workers’ UI history is only
surveyed when the supplement takes place (every two years), I obtain the transition rates by
merging the January supplement data with the basic monthly data for the following February.
Transition rates are calculated as a fraction of unemployed workers conditioned on their UI status
(i.e., whether they are currently receiving UI benefits or not) and possibly other characteristics
moving into either employment, unemployment, or OLF in the following month.
9Specifically, insured unemployed workers had a lower job finding rate than uninsured unem-
ployed workers in most subgroups in 2008 and in all subgroups in 2010. The job finding rates
from 2008 to 2010 for current UI recipients in most subgroups fell by a larger magnitude than for
non-UI recipients.
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change in the UOLF rate. This is the case regardless of the UI status. Table 1
shows that from 2008 to 2010 the UU rate increased by 16pp for workers with UI
and by 12pp for workers without UI. At the same time, Table 1 shows that the fall
in the UOLF rate was only 2(3)pp for the (un)insured unemployed. This suggests
that UI extensions do not significantly affect the labour force exit rate.10 The
same results apply when I condition on other observable worker characteristics as
shown in Table A.2 and A.3 of Appendix A.
Distribution of unemployment duration The share of long-term unemployed
workers who were current UI recipients rose substantially from 15 percent to 51
percent between 2008 and 2010 as shown in Figure 3. This large increase in the
share of current UI recipients during the Great Recession is a prominent feature
in all subgroups considered as shown in Table A.4 of Appendix A. In Figure 3, I
contrast this with the shares of insured workers amongst the newly unemployed
that did not increase as much.
These empirical findings motivate the model in the next section to feature a de-
gree of worker heterogeneity and endogenous job search intensity which together
imply heterogeneous job finding probabilities.
3 Model
I present a search and matching model a` la Pissarides (2000) with endogenous
separations, variable job search intensity, and on-the-job search. On top of this, I
allow for the maximum UI duration to depend on the unemployment rate. Work-
ers differ in terms of UI status, benefit level, and labour productivity. Only the
last attribute is permanent. These differences not only affect how hard workers
search for jobs, but also how likely worker-firm matches are formed and sepa-
rated. Workers with higher outside options, e.g. those with higher (potential) UI
benefits, tend to exit unemployment more slowly and are more likely to quit. I
begin this section by specifying technology and preferences of workers and firms
as well as the UI duration policy and UI eligibility. I then discuss wage determi-
nation, and finally I present the equilibrium conditions.
10For simplicity, the model I present in the following section will therefore not feature the
labour force participation margin. Barnichon and Figura (2014) also find that UI extensions did
not affect the labour force participation rate in the past 35 years.
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3.1 Technology and Preferences
Time is discrete and runs forever. There are two types of agents in the econ-
omy: a continuum of workers of measure one and a large measure of firms.
Workers have either high or low productivity (type H or L). A match consists
of one worker and one firm whose output depends on the aggregate productiv-
ity (z), its match-specific productivity (m), and type-i worker’s productivity (ηi).
Specifically, yit(m) = zt ×m× ηi ; i ∈ {H,L}. The price of output yit(m) is
normalised to one. The aggregate productivity z has an AR(1) representation:
lnzt = ρz lnzt−1 + εt where εt ∼ N(0,σ2z ) is the only exogenous shock in the
model. The match-specific productivity m is drawn at the start of every new
worker-firm match from a distribution F(m). A given match gets to keep its
match quality m to the next period with probability 1−λ , otherwise it redraws a
new m from F(m) for its production next period. ηi is type-i worker’s productivity
where ηL < ηH ≡ 1. A worker’s productivity is permanent.
With respect to preferences, both workers and firms are infinitely-lived and
risk-neutral. They discount future flows by the same factor β ∈ (0,1). Work-
ers are either employed (e), insured unemployed (UI), or uninsured unemployed
(UU). They exert job search effort s at the cost of νe(s) when employed, and
at the cost νu(s) when unemployed regardless of their UI status. These search
cost functions νe(.) and νu(.) are strictly increasing and convex. During unem-
ployment, workers’ job search intensity may vary depending on their UI status,
benefit level, and both aggregate and individual productivities, whilst during em-
ployment, it depends on their match quality and both aggregate and individual
productivities.11 For employment status j ∈ {e,u}, a worker’s period utility flow
is ci−ν j(s) where ci is type-i worker’s consumption:
cit =

wit(m, m˜) if employed at match quality m
h+bi(m˜) if insured unemployed
h if uninsured unemployed
11Unemployment duration could be an important factor since the insured unemployed closer
to benefit exhaustion (or with a higher rate of exhaustion) search harder for jobs. I allowed for
unemployment duration to be an individual state variable and find that the results remain largely
the same. This is due to the risk neutrality assumption. If workers are instead risk averse, their job
search response to unemployment duration is expected to be stronger but such analysis is beyond
the scope of the paper.
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where wi(m, m˜) is the wage of type-i worker that depends on m, the current match
quality, and m˜, the match quality in her most recent employment. h can be inter-
preted as home production or leisure flow during unemployment. bi(m˜) is the UI
benefit of type-i worker with match quality m˜ in her most recent employment. I
describe the UI system and the wage determination in the next subsections.
Firms are either matched with a worker or unmatched. Matched firms sell
output, pay negotiated wage to their workers, and pay lump-sum tax τ to finance
the UI payment. A match is exogenously separated at rate δ , and an endogenous
separation can occur when the value of a worker being matched to a firm or vice
versa is negative. When firms are unmatched with a worker, they post a vacancy
at cost κ and cannot direct their posting to a specific type of workers.
3.1.1 UI Duration Policy and UI Eligibility
UI Duration The maximum UI duration is captured by the variable φ(ut).
Specifically, insured unemployed workers exhaust their UI benefits at the rate
φ(ut) ≡ φL1{ut ≥ u¯}+φH1{ut < u¯}
where φL < φH implying that the UI exhaustion rate is a decreasing function of
the unemployment rate ut in the economy.12 Since the inverse of φ(ut) is the ex-
pected duration of receiving UI benefits, a fall in the rate implies a UI extension.
This is set to mimic the rules for UI extensions in the US where they depend on
the state unemployment rate (above which UI extensions are triggered).13 I can
capture the observed increase in the generosity of UI extensions in the US by
lowering in the value that φL takes. Economic agents can predict whether a UI
extension will be triggered/terminated next period by keeping track of unemploy-
ment and relevant distributions.
UI Eligibility Upon losing a job, employed workers become uninsured at rate
1−ψ . This reflects how some unemployed workers do not take up UI benefits. On
top of this, insured unemployed workers lose UI eligibility after an unproductive
meeting with a firm at rate ξ to reflect how UI recipients’ job search is monitored.
12This stochastic UI exhaustion is first used in Fredericksson and Holmlund (2001). Mitman
and Rabinovich (2014), Faig, Zhang and Zhang (2016), and Rujiwattanapong (2017) treat this
rate to be state-dependent.
13Specifically, during normal times (ut < u¯), the UI exhaustion rate is φH which is set to imply
a standard UI duration of 26 weeks. When the unemployment rate is high and above u¯ (often in
recessions), insured unemployed workers exhaust the benefits at a slower rate φL.
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UI payment is financed each period by lump-sum tax (τ) levied on matched
firms:
τ(1−u) = ∑
i∈{H,L}
∑˜
m
uUIi (m˜)bi(m˜) (1)
where uUIi (m˜) is the number of type-i insured unemployed workers whose UI
benefit is bi(m˜).
3.1.2 Search and Matching
Workers and unmatched firms meet via a meeting function M(s,v) where s is
the aggregate search intensity, and v is the number of job vacancies. The meeting
function M(., .) has constant returns to scale and is strictly increasing and concave
in its arguments. Market tightness can be defined as θ ≡ v/s. The conditional job
finding probability per unit of search is Ms = M(1,θ); therefore, the conditional
job finding probability of type-i worker with employment status j is s jiM(1,θ)≡
p ji (θ).
14 Analogously, the probability that a firm meets a worker is Mv ≡ q(θ).
3.1.3 Timing
1) Given (ut ,zt), production takes place, and UI duration policy φ(ut) is set. 2)
Workers choose job search effort. 3) Current matches draw a new m at rate λ . 4)
Workers and unmatched firms meet. 5) Aggregate productivity zt+1 next period
is realised. 6) Matches/meetings dissolve. 7) uUI lose UI eligibility at rate φ(ut)
if not meeting a firm, or at rate φ(ut)+
(
1−φ(ut)
)
ξ if a meeting has occurred.
8) Unemployment ut+1 for next period is realised.
3.1.4 Workers’ Value Functions
I first define the set of state variables asω ≡{z,u,ui,uUIi (m˜),uUUi ,ei(m); ∀m,∀m˜ and i∈
{H,L}} where ui is the number of type-i unemployed workers, uUIi (m˜) is the
number of type-i insured unemployed workers whose match quality in their most
recent employment was m˜, uUUi is the number of type-i uninsured unemployed
workers, and ei(m) is the number of type-i employed workers with current match
14The conditional job finding probability is essentially the probability that a worker meets a
firm. The true job finding rate depends on whether such a meeting leads to a successful match
formation.
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quality m.
Employed workers The value of a type-i employed worker with last period’s
employment status and associated benefit level j ∈ {e(m˜),UI(m˜),UU} is
W ji (m;ω) = maxsei (m;ω)
w ji (m;ω)−νe(sei (m;ω))+βEω ′|ω
[
(1−δ )(1−λ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(stay matched, keep m)
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(stay with current firm)
W e(m)+i (m;ω
′)
+ pei (m;ω)(1−F(m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(move to new firm)
Em′|m′>m[W
e(m)+
i (m
′;ω ′)]
]
+(1−δ )λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(stay matched, new m)
Em′
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(stay with current firm)
W e(m)+i (m
′;ω ′)
+ pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(move to new firm)
Em′′|m′′>m′[W
e(m)+
i (m
′′;ω ′)]
]
+ δ︸︷︷︸
Pr(match exogenously separated)
(
(1−ψ)UUIi (m,ω ′)+ψUUUi (ω ′)
)]
(2)
where W e(m)+i (m
′;ω ′) ≡ max{W e(m)i (m′;ω ′),(1−ψ)UUIi (m,ω ′) +ψUUUi (ω ′)}
showing that employed workers can always become unemployed (and get unem-
ployment insurance at rate 1−ψ).15 UUIi (m) and UUUi are respectively the value
of the insured unemployed with benefit bi(m) and the value of the uninsured un-
employed. The expressions for optimal search intensity of employed workers are
in Appendix B.
Unemployed worker The difference between insured and uninsured workers
stems from the period utility flow during unemployment. Amongst insured un-
employed workers, their period utility flow can differ according to m˜, their match
quality in the most recent employment, since UI benefits are attached to this vari-
able. Therefore, the values of type-i uninsured unemployed workers and insured
15Similar to the argument made in Krause and Lubik (2010), the current wage affects neither the
decision of the employed worker to quit nor their job search effort due to the timing of the model
and the bargaining structure. As a result, the bargaining set is still convex, and Nash bargaining is
still applicable for the determination of wage. Shimer (2006) discusses the implications of having
a non-convex payoff set.
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unemployed workers with benefit bi(m˜) are respectively
UUUi (ω) = max
sUUi (ω)
h−νu(sUUi (ω))+βEm′ω ′|ω
[
... (3)
pUUi (ω)max{WUUi (m′;ω ′),UUUi (ω ′)}+(1− pUUi (ω))UUUi (ω ′)
]
UUIi (m˜,ω) = max
sUIi (m˜,ω)
bi(m˜)+h−νu(sUIi (m˜,ω))
+βEm′ω ′|ω
[
pUIi (m˜,ω)max
{
WUI(m˜)i (m
′;ω ′), ...
(1−φu)(1−ξ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(keep UI | meeting a firm)
UUIi (m˜,ω
′)+
(
φu+(1−φu)ξ
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(lose UI | meeting a firm)
UUUi (ω
′)
}
+(1− pUIi (m˜,ω))
(
(1−φu)UUIi (m˜,ω ′)+φuUUUi (ω ′)
)]
(4)
Insured and uninsured unemployed workers when meeting a firm (with prob-
ability pUI(.) and pUU(.) respectively) can either go into production and work
or remain unemployed in the next period. The expressions for optimal search
intensity of insured and uninsured unemployed workers are in Appendix B.
3.1.5 Firms
Matched firms The value of a matched firm with type-i worker whose work
history is j ∈ {e(m˜),UI(m˜),UU} is
J ji (m;ω) = yi(m;ω)−w ji (m;ω)− τ(ω)+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m)))Je(m)+i (m;ω ′)
]
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Je(m)+i (m′;ω ′)
]]
(5)
where Je(m)+i (m
′;ω ′)≡max{Je(m)i (m′;ω ′),0}. Note that I have already imposed
the free entry condition which implies the value of an unmatched firm is zero, i.e.
V (ω) = 0,∀ω .
Unmatched firms Since the search is random, the distribution of workers’ search
intensity over employment status, UI status, benefit level, productivity type, and
match quality of on-the-job searchers (as denoted by ζ ’s in the following equa-
tion) enters the unmatched firm’s problem and, therefore, becomes a part of the
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state variables. The value of an unmatched firm is
V (ω) = −κ+βq(ω)Eω ′|ω
[
∑
i∈{H,L}
(
∑
m
ζ ei (m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[Je(m)+i (m′;ω ′)]
+∑
m
ζUIi (m,ω)Em′[J
UI(m)+
i (m
′;ω ′)]+ζUUi (ω)Em′ [J
UU+
i (m
′;ω ′)]
)]
(6)
where
ζ ei (m) =
(1−λ )sei (m)ei(m)+λ f (m)∑m sei (m)ei(m)
s
ζUIi (m) =
sUIi (m)u
UI
i (m)
s
; ζUUi =
sUUi u
UU
i
s
s = ∑
i∈{H,L}
(
∑
m
(
sei (m)ei(m)+ s
UI
i (m)u
UI
i (m)
)
+ sUUi u
UU
i
)
3.2 Wage and Surplus
Wages are negotiated bilaterally using a generalised Nash bargaining rule. Type-
i employed workers with previous employment status j ∈ {e(m˜),UI(m˜),UU} and
match quality m receive
w ji (m;ω) = argmax
(
WS ji (m;ω)
)µ(
J ji (m;ω)
)(1−µ)
(7)
where µ is the worker’s bargaining power. WS ji is the surplus of type-i employed
workers with history j, and it is the difference between the value of working
and the corresponding outside option. We can define the total match surplus S ji ≡
WS ji +J
j
i . As a result,WS
j
i = µS
j
i and J
j
i = (1−µ)S ji . The surpluses of employed
workers are as follows
WSe(m˜)i (m;ω) ≡ W e(m˜)i (m;ω)− (1−ψ)UUIi (m˜,ω)−ψUUUi (ω)
WSUI(m˜)i (m;ω) ≡ WUI(m˜)i (m;ω)− (1−φ(u))(1−ξ )UUIi (m˜,ω)
−(φ(u)+(1−φ(u))ξ )UUUi (ω)
WSUUi (m;ω) ≡ WUUi (m;ω)−UUUi (ω)
The expressions for total match surpluses can be found in Appendix B.
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3.3 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium is characterised by value functions,W e(m˜)i (m;ω),
WUI(m˜)i (m;ω),W
UU
i (m;ω),U
UI
i (m˜,ω),U
UU
i (ω), J
e(m˜)
i (m;ω), J
UI(m˜)
i (m;ω), J
UU
i (m;ω),
andV (ω); market tightness θ(ω); search policy sei (m;ω), s
UI
i (m,ω) and s
UU
i (ω);
and wage functions we(m˜)i (m;ω), w
UI(m˜)
i (m;ω), and w
UU
i (m;ω), such that, given
the initial distribution of workers over productivity level, employment status, UI
status, benefit level and match productivity, the government’s policy τ(ω) and
φ(ω), and the law of motion for z:
1. The value functions and the market tightness satisfy the Bellman equations
for workers and firms and the free entry condition, namely, equations (2),
(3), (4), (5), and (6).
2. The search decisions satisfy the FOCs for optimal search intensity, which
are equations (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3).
3. The wage functions satisfy the FOCs for the generalised Nash bargaining
rule (equation (7)).
4. The government’s budget constraint is satisfied each period (equation (1)).
5. The distribution of workers evolves according to the transition equations
(C.1), (C.3), and (C.4), which are in Appendix C, consistent with the max-
imising behaviour of agents.
3.4 Solving the Model
In order to compute the market tightness in the model, economic agents must
keep track of the distribution of workers over the productivity level, employ-
ment status, UI status, benefit level, and match quality {ei(m),uUIi (m˜),uUUi ; i ∈
{H,L},∀m, m˜} as they enter the vacancy creation condition (equation 6). To
predict the next period’s unemployment rate they need to know the inflow into
and outflow from unemployment which are based on this distribution. I use the
Krusell & Smith (1998) algorithm to predict the laws of motion for both the in-
sured and total unemployment rates as a function of current unemployment (u)
and aggregate productivity (z). As the distributions of employed workers by
match quality and insured unemployed workers by benefit level do not vary much
over time, I use the stochastic steady state distributions16 and adjust for the em-
16Stochastic steady state distributions are obtained by simulating the economy over long peri-
ods and controlling for the aggregate productivity (z) to be constant at its mean. For the distribu-
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ployment rate inferred from the state variables. I report the performance of this
approximation in Appendix D.
4 Calibration
Before I calibrate the model to match the US economy, I specify the functional
forms for the search cost functions, the distribution of the match quality, and the
meeting function between workers and firms. I obtain a subset of the parameters
using the simulated method of moments. The remaining parameters are taken
from the empirical data and the literature. Table 3 summarises the pre-specified
parameters and Table 5 describes the calibrated ones.
Functional forms The search cost function takes the following power function:
ν j(s) = a js1+d j ; j ∈ {e,u} where a j > 0 and d j > 0. I distinguish the search cost
only between employment (e) and unemployment (u) to control for the relation-
ship between the job-to-job transition rate and the job finding rate.17 Regarding
the match quality distribution, a worker-firm match draws a new m from the fol-
lowing Beta distribution: F(m) = m+ betacdf(m−m,β1,β2) where β1 > 0 and
β2 > 0, and m > 0 is the lowest match quality. The meeting function between
unmatched firms and workers is similar to that in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson
(2000) with the introduction of search intensity: M(s,v) = sv
(sl+vl)1/l
; l > 0
Discretisation I discretise the aggregate productivity (z) using Rouwenhurst
(1995)’s method to approximate an AR(1) process with a finite-state Markov
chain. For both z and F(m), I use 51 nodes when solving the model and 5,100
nodes by linear interpolation in the simulations.18 Finally, I use 101 equidistant
nodes to approximate the unemployment rate between 0.02 to 0.2.
Simulation I apply the calibrated model to the US economy by feeding in (1)
productivity shocks that match the deviations of output (GDP per capita) from its
HP trend and (2) the observed maximum UI durations during each recession. It
is useful to note that the timing of each UI extension and how long it lasts are not
predetermined but a result of the model’s simulated unemployment series which
can be used to measure how well the model can replicate the US labour market.
tion of the insured unemployed, I also separate between high and low unemployment states as UI
extensions affect the shape of this distribution.
17Workers of type-H and type-L face the same cost of search and so do unemployed workers
with and without UI.
18I define f (m) as F ′(m)/∑mF ′(m) where F ′(m) is the probability density function of F(m).
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Additionally, from May 2007, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation law
has included the “Reachback Provision” providing UI eligibility to unemployed
workers who have already exhausted their benefits prior to the extensions of UI.
I simulate the model accordingly and study the impact of this programme in the
results section.
4.1 Pre-specified Parameters
The pre-specified parameters are summarised in Tables 3 and 4. The model is
monthly, and I assign the discount factor β to be 0.9967, implying an annual inter-
est rate of 4% which is the US average. Following Fujita and Ramey (2012), the
vacancy creation cost κ is set to be 0.0392.19 I assign µ , the worker’s bargaining
power, to be 0.5 following den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000).
φH and φL are respectively the UI exhaustion rates during normal periods and
recessions. I set φH to be 1/6 which implies the standard maximum UI duration
of 26 weeks given the monthly frequency. As for the UI extensions during reces-
sions, I sort them into four main UI duration groups: (1) 39 weeks for January
1948 - December 1971, (2) 52 weeks for January 1972 - December 1974 and July
1982 - September 1991, (3) 68 weeks for January 1975 - June 1982 and October
1991 - July 2008, and (4) 90 weeks for August 2008 - June 2014. These four du-
rations are obtained by averaging the observed maximum UI durations over the
respective periods when UI was extended. The value φL changes and implies the
maximum UI durations according to these UI duration regimes.20 I set u¯ to be
6.5% which historically has been used as a criterion in most UI extensions, albeit
towards the upper end.
To determine the utility flow of type-i unemployed workers, h and, if insured,
bi(m), I use the results in Gruber (1997). In particular, the drop in consumption
for newly unemployed workers is 10% when receiving UI and 24% when not
19Using survey evidence on vacancy durations and hours spent on vacancy posting, Fujita and
Ramey (2012) find the vacancy cost to be 17% of a 40-hour-work week. Normalising the mean
productivity to unity, this gives the value of 0.17 per week or 0.0392 per month. The actual mean
productivity may be higher than (but not greatly different from) unity due to truncation from below
of the match-specific quality.
20Note that these are the maximum UI durations used only when the unemployment rate is
above the threshold u¯. For example, in the simulation, the UI extension in the Great Recession is
not triggered until April 2009.
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receiving UI given the replacement rate of 50%.21 To find the implied h and bi(m)
given a set of parameters, I first guess the mean wages for the (type-i) employed
with different match qualities {w0(m),w0i (m);∀m} and set h such that the average
ratio of h to w0(m) is 0.76 (where I use the steady state distribution of unemployed
workers over match qualities to compute the weighted average). bi(m) is set such
that the ratio of h+bi(m) to w0i (m) is 0.9 for each match quality m. I then solve
and simulate the model to check if the guess is close to its simulated counterpart.
If it is not, I replace the guessed wages with the simulated ones and repeat until
they are close enough.22
The slope of the unemployed’s search cost function au is normalised such that
the search effort of the uninsured unemployed sUU is unity when the economy is
in the steady state, similar to Nagypa´l (2005). The power parameters in the search
cost functions for both employed and unemployed workers (de and du) are set to
unity in line with Christensen, Lentz, and Mortensen (2005) and Yashiv (2000)
implying a quadratic search cost function. As these parameters are important for
the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the maximum UI dura-
tion, I discuss in the next section how the results are comparable to the existing
literature.
4.2 Calibrated Parameters
I use the simulated method of moments to assign values to the remaining twelve
parameters {l,δ ,λ ,ψ,ξ ,ae,m,β1,β2,ρz,σz,ηL} by matching main statistics in
the US labour market and the labour productivity process during 1948-2007.23
The targeted moments are reported in Table 2 along with their empirical counter-
21Aguiar and Hurst (2005) report the drop in food consumption of workers upon becoming
unemployed to be 5% and the drop in food expenditure to be 19%. However, in their study, unem-
ployed workers are not distinguished by their UI status which makes it impossible to separately
identify h and bi(m)’s under the present calibration strategy.
22It is useful to note that there is a benefit cap in the US which varies from state to state. The
average maximum UI benefit is around USD 441 per week. Given a 50-percent replacement rate,
this implies that anyone whose income is above the 58th percentile will face a cap on their UI
benefits in the US. Since the benefit levels are calibrated to match the consumption drops for
newly unemployed workers, these benefits levels are in fact always smaller than half of the labour
income at the 58th percentile in my model. Specifically, the maximum UI benefit payment in the
model is 0.3 whereas the 58th percentile of the labour income is 0.73 implying a benefit cap at
0.36 with a 50-percent replacement rate.
23The transition rates are author’s own calculations based on the CPS data. For output, I use
the quarterly real GDP series provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and I use the
BLS quarterly series for non-farm output per job to represent the labour productivity.
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parts. Table 6 shows other related moments not targeted in the calibration. The
values of calibrated parameters are in Table 5.
For targeted moments, the baseline model matches the twelve targeted mo-
ments quite well overall. However, the insured unemployment rate is slightly
higher, and the job finding rate is more volatile than in the data. For non-targeted
moments, the model matches the dynamics of unemployment grouped in four du-
ration bins quite well in terms of the first and second moments. However, the
model could further improve on the volatility of vacancies and the correlation
between unemployment and vacancies.24
5 Results
The results in this section are based on the aggregate productivity series that
matches the deviations of output from its HP trend as depicted in Figure 4.25
5.1 Performance
UI Extensions Figure 5 shows that the model is successful in generating real-
istic UI extensions in terms of both when they are triggered and how long each
extension lasts. This is due to how well the model replicates the US unemploy-
ment series (of which UI extensions are a function) as shown in Figure 6. The
model does exceptionally well in capturing the dynamics of unemployment dur-
ing the Great Recession. The series noticeably overshoots in the early 2000s. I
address this issue in the last part of this subsection by correcting for the state-level
implementation of UI extensions.
Long-term Unemployment Figure 7 shows that the model can account for a
large fraction of the observed rise in long-term unemployment in the Great Reces-
sion, but it tends to overshoot and does not produce enough persistence in certain
recessions. The main reason for this is due to the sudden change in the opti-
mal job search behaviour of insured unemployed workers when a UI extension is
terminated, a mechanism that I will discuss in the next subsection.
24The main reason why vacancies are not as volatile as they are in the data is due to the endoge-
nous separation margin. In recessions, unemployment increases at a faster rate from endogenous
match separations which makes vacancy posting less costly, and this counteracts with the effect
of negative aggregate shocks.
25We can see that the drop in aggregate productivity during the Great Recession is neither of
larger magnitude nor does it exhibit more persistence than in previous recessions.
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Distribution of Unemployment Duration Figure 8 shows that the model pro-
duces a substantial rise in the average unemployment duration in the Great Re-
cession, but, similar to long-term unemployment, it generates little persistence
once compared to the data. It does very well in producing a realistic shift in the
distribution of unemployment duration towards longer duration bins. In Figure 9,
I plot the distributions in December 2007 and June 2010, where UI was only ex-
tended in the latter case.26 With respect to the entire 1948-2014 period, I show in
Figure 10 the shares of unemployment by four duration bins (less than 1 month,
2-3 months, 4-6 months, and longer than 6 months). These figures suggest that
the model is suitable for studying the dynamics of the entire distribution of un-
employment duration and not just the long-term unemployment dynamics.
Job Findings In the left panel of Figure 11, I compare the model’s job finding
rate with the empirical series. Despite a clear negative trend that the model does
not feature, it produces a fall in the job finding rate during the Great Recession
similar in magnitude to that in the data. When I condition on the UI status of
workers as displayed in the right panel of same figure, we can see that (1) the job
finding rate of the insured unemployed workers is lower and falls more dramat-
ically than that of the uninsured during the Great Recession. Both features are
consistent with findings from the empirical section.
State-level Implementation of UI Extensions In the US, implementations of
UI extensions are at the state level. Therefore, it is possible that the maximum
potential UI duration announced at the federal level does not coincide with the
average maximum potential UI duration implemented across states, especially
when only few states implement UI extensions. This is exactly the case in the
early 2000 recession where only 5 states implemented UI extensions making the
average maximum potential UI duration to be 30 weeks shorter than the federally
announced maximum duration. This stark difference affects the model’s results
significantly. Figure 12 shows that, for the 2000 recession, total unemployment
no longer overshoots (if anything, slightly undershoots) when the average UI du-
ration is used in the simulation. As a result, UI extension is not triggered, and
thus long-term unemployment is only mildly affected.
That said, the results for the Great Recession are robust to using the cross-
state average of maximum UI duration since 49 states actually implemented the
26I choose June 2010 because it is when the model’s long-term unemployment rate reaches its
peak. Additionally, the model generates a hump in the distribution in 2010 similar to the empirical
distribution owing to the endogenous separation margin.
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extensions, and therefore the federally announced maximum UI duration is just
5 weeks longer than the average across states. Unfortunately, the state-level UI
implementation data can be obtained from only 1999. However, as the focus
of the paper is on the Great Recession, all the results during this episode are
computed based on the actual implementation of UI extensions across states.27
5.2 Mechanisms
Job Search Behaviour The optimal job search behaviour of workers respond
to UI extensions in the following ways: (1) only the search intensity of insured
unemployed workers varies with the maximum UI duration, and (2) the higher
the benefit level the lower the search effort is exerted, and such behaviour is more
pronounced when the extended UI duration is longer.
Figure 13’s top left panel shows that the conditional job finding rate of the in-
sured unemployed workers drops when UI is extended (implied by u≥ u¯= 6.5%)
whilst the rates for the employed and uninsured unemployed are largely constant.
Figure 13’s top right panel shows that, amongst the insured unemployed, job
search effort decreases in the amount of benefit. In terms of worker heterogene-
ity, higher productivity workers exert slightly more search effort as their value
during employment is relatively higher than the lower productivity type. The job
finding rates between the two productivity types during 1948-2014 are quite sim-
ilar. However, when considering different UI statuses, the job finding rate of the
insured unemployed is smaller and exhibits higher volatility. This suggests that
once we condition on the UI status, workers’ productivity types contribute little
to the rise of long-term unemployment and unemployment duration. Job findings
are driven not only by the job search behaviour but also by the decision between
a worker and a firm to form a match once they meet. Such decisions along with
match separation decisions are also affected by the endogenous UI extensions as
I discuss next.
Match Formation/Separation We know that the worker’s surplus from be-
ing employed and the value of a producing firm (WS ji (m;ω) and J
j
i (m;ω); j ∈
{e(m˜),UI(m˜),UU}) are simply a constant fraction of a total match surplus (µS ji (m;ω)
and (1− µ)S ji (m;ω) respectively). Therefore, both workers and firms always
agree when a match should be formed (when S ji (m;ω)> 0) and when it should be
27More availability of the state-level UI implementation data would be useful in potentially
explaining the overshooting of the long-term unemployment series.
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separated (when S ji (m;ω)< 0). A match surplus when a worker is currently em-
ployed, Se(m˜)i (m;ω), determines endogenous match separations whereas a match
surplus when a worker is currently unemployed, either SUI(m˜)i (m;ω) or S
UU
i (m;ω),
determines how many matches will be formed, given that unemployed workers
and firms have met.
Figure 13’s bottom left panel shows that total match surpluses for employed
and insured unemployed workers, Se(m˜)i (m;ω) and S
UI(m˜)
i (m;ω), decrease in un-
employment, and they decrease at a faster rate when UI is extended (u ≥ u¯).28
The longer the extended duration, the more drastic is the drop in the match sur-
plus. Further, SUI(m˜)i (m;ω) decreases in m˜ in Figure 13’s bottom right panel. A
higher m˜ implies a higher outside option of the insured unemployed, h+ bi(m˜),
meaning that a match is less likely to be formed.29 A similar argument applies
to Se(m˜)i (m;ω) but, instead, on the job separation margin where h+ bi(m˜) is the
outside option of an employed worker if she quits and is eligible for UI.30
What Drives (Long-term) Unemployment? I study the contribution of 3 UI
channels (job search behaviour, match formation and job separation) on unem-
ployment and its duration during the Great Recession by fixing/shutting down
one channel at a time (assuming that a given channel does not respond to UI
extensions).31 I find that long-term unemployment is largely unaffected by the
response of match formation and dissolution but it falls drastically (over 3pp)
when the job search channel is shut down as shown in Figure 14. Despite a small
impact on long-term unemployment, the job separation margin is most important
in driving total unemployment.32
28It can be seen that the match surplus for the uninsured unemployed workers is higher when
the UI extension is longer. This is because it is actually better for the uninsured unemployed to
regain employment and potentially qualify for UI benefits.
29m instead increases SUI(m˜)i (m;ω) because a higher match quality in the production raises the
firm’s profit and the worker’s wage and potential UI benefit after being employed with m.
30In the simulation, the success rate of worker-firm meetings is, despite procyclical, always
very close to one. The reasons are (1) for insured workers, those likely to have an unproductive
meeting have currently high UI benefits, and it is unlikely for them to meet a firm in the first place,
and (2) for uninsured workers, the surplus from working is very high due to their lower outside
option which means the meetings are likely to lead to viable matches.
31Note that the path of aggregate shocks (z) is as in the baseline model (Figure 4). I shut down
a channel by setting the unemployment rate used in the respective policy function to be at the
pre-Great Recession level which is less than u¯ implying that UI is not extended.
32I also study the contribution of vacancy creation on long-term unemployment. However, its
effect is small because the volatility of vacancies in the model is rather low relative to the data.
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5.3 Policy Experiment
In this counterfactual exercise, I eliminate all UI extensions during the Great
Recession (by increasing the UI exhaustion rate, φ(u), to φL implying a shorter
maximum UI duration of 26 weeks) and quantify their effects on unemployment
and its duration structure given the same path of aggregate productivity shocks (z)
as in the baseline model (Figure 4). I compute both the microeconomic and gen-
eral equilibrium effects of UI. The former features only the higher UI exhaustion
rate and the response of job search behaviour to the shorter UI duration, and it is
comparable to results from the existing literature. The latter considers also the re-
sponses of match separations and match formations to the shorter UI duration.33
Table 7 summarises the results from this experiment.
Long-term unemployment The removal of UI extension has a large impact
on long-term unemployment even when workers and firms do not react to this
change. This is not surprising because, given the standard UI duration (of 26
weeks), all long-term unemployed workers are uninsured by definition, and unin-
sured unemployed workers have a much higher job finding rate than do insured
unemployed workers. As a result, by removing all UI extensions during the Great
Recession, the peak of long-term unemployment falls drastically from 4.7 per-
cent in the baseline model to 1 percent when workers and firms do not react to the
shorter maximum UI duration (as shown in Table 7).34
Unemployment Total unemployment is less affected by the removal of UI ex-
tensions than long-term unemployment. The impact of increasing the UI exhaus-
tion rate is a slight fall of less than 1pp in the unemployment rate (measured at
its peak) as shown in Table 7. When the job search behaviour responds to the
extension removal, the peak falls by 1.8pp. It is only in the general equilibrium
context, where match separation decisions also react to the extension removal,
that the peak of the unemployment rate falls by 2.9pp.
The microeconomic effect of UI on total unemployment is more subdued is
because it concerns only a subgroup of unemployed workers (namely, those with
33It is clear from the previous decomposition exercise that the response of match formation to
UI extensions is negligible.
34It is useful to note that the large microeconomic effect of UI on long-term unemployment
relies on the higher job finding rate of uninsured unemployed workers when compared to the
insured. By incorporating genuine duration dependence in the job finding rate, the UI effect could
become smaller since unemployed workers who recently exhausted UI cannot increase their job
finding rate as much as in the baseline model. Therefore, the insured unemployment state is less
desirable and there will be fewer insured unemployed workers during UI extensions.
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UI), whilst for the general equilibrium effect, the match separation margin ap-
plies to all employed workers and determines the inflow of (insured) unemployed
workers. This same argument also explains why the micro effect of UI on long-
term unemployment is large.
This result is consistent with the existing literature on the effects of UI exten-
sions on unemployment in the Great Recession. Most of the studies focus on the
micro effect where the worker-firm relationships are not taken into account and
find that the unemployment rate would have been 0.1-1.8pp lower had there been
no UI extensions. This is in line with the micro effect of UI extensions previ-
ously discussed. The larger general equilibrium effect of UI extensions in this
model is similar to findings in Hagedorn et al. (2019), but they focus the im-
pact on vacancy creation whilst mine comes from job separations.35 Lastly, the
unemployment rate is much less persistent when there is no UI extensions, i.e.
there would be no jobless recoveries. This result is consistent with the findings in
Mitman and Rabinovich (2014).
Non-linearity of UI effects In Table 7, I also report the effects of removing
UI extensions during the early 1990s recession (equivalent of cutting 42 weeks
of UI duration). There is a non-linearity of the UI effects on all variables con-
sidered. For example, a one-week reduction of UI duration reduces an average
unemployment duration by 0.3 weeks during the 1990s recession36 but for the
Great Recession this number is 0.4 weeks. This is mainly due to the different
paths of shocks that hit the economy. As can be seen in Figure 4, the Great Re-
cession features a larger but less persistent negative shock comparing to the early
1990s recession. This suggests that the unemployment cost of UI extension is less
pronounced when a recession is more persistent (e.g. the early 1990s) since it is
more difficult for workers to find a job regardless of the maximum UI duration.
5.4 Reachback Provision Programme
From May 2007, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation law has in-
cluded the “Reachback Provision” providing UI eligibility to unemployed work-
ers who have already exhausted their benefits prior to the UI extensions. This
35Figure 15 shows that indeed the empirical job separation rate was particularly high during the
Great Recession when compared to other recessions.
36If we only consider the micro effect of UI extensions, this number is around 0.26 for the
1990s recession which is still higher than the existing empirical findings of around 0.1-0.2. See,
for example, Katz and Meyer (1990), Moffitt (1985), and Moffitt and Nicholson (1982).
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programme can potentially affect long-term unemployment since it is targeted
directly at this group of workers. As the programme is already incorporated in
the baseline case, I can measure its effect by removing the programme and leav-
ing everything else the same. The results are summarised in Table 8. I find that
Reachback Provision does not have a significant impact on the aggregate labour
market. The (long-term) unemployment rate is only 0.1pp smaller than in the
baseline model. The small effect is explained by the fact that the subgroup of
workers who are affected by the programme represents just 3.5% of the unem-
ployment population. However, from the CPS data, the true effect of this pro-
gramme could be non-trivial since unemployed workers who already exhausted
UI represented a substantial 44% of the long-term unemployed in January 2008.
The model produces a much smaller number for this group of workers because
once the insured unemployed exhaust their benefits, they adopt the job search be-
haviour of the uninsured which implies a much higher unemployment exit rate
than the insured.
5.5 Rational Expectations
As a high unemployment rate triggers UI extensions, agents can form expec-
tations about future unemployment to gauge the probability that a UI extension
occurs or terminates. To quantify the importance of rational expectations about
the timing of UI extensions, I compare the baseline results to an alternative sce-
nario where UI extensions (and how long they last) are completely unexpected to
the agents. This is the ‘adaptive expectations’ in Mitman and Rabinovich (2014)
where agents assume the maximum UI duration to remain the same until they
observe otherwise. This new UI duration policy is just a constant instead of a
function of unemployment, i.e. φ instead of φ(u). When UI extensions are as-
sumed to last forever, the UI effects are expected to be more drastic because (1)
the insured unemployed will lower search effort, (2) matches are less likely to
be formed, and (3) matches are more likely to separate. I find that disregarding
rational expectations about the timing of UI extensions leads to a significant over-
estimation of both total and long-term unemployment by over 2pp at the peak of
the Great Recession and an overestimation of average unemployment duration by
almost 4 weeks as shown in Table 8. Therefore, it is vital that rational expecta-
tions are taken into account when studying the effects of UI extensions in general
equilibrium.
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5.6 On-the-job Search
In this exercise, I show how on-the-job search contributes to unemployment
and its duration distribution during the Great Recession. On the one hand, on-
the-job search allows employed workers to improve their match qualities and the
associated UI benefits if they become insured unemployed. Since the job search
effort and job finding rates are decreasing in the benefit level, this would increase
unemployment and its duration. On the other hand, on-the-job search increases
the value of being employed. Therefore, more unemployed workers would be in-
duced to take up job offers even when the first match quality draws are not great
(since they can search on the job and leave their current matches with not so great
match qualities) and spend less time in unemployment. The last column of Table
8 shows the main results when on-the-job search is not allowed. I find that, during
the Great Recession when UI is extended, on-the-job search contributes to a small
but significant increase in (long-term) unemployment of up to (0.4) 0.5pp from
the baseline model as well as a 1-week increase in the average unemployment du-
ration. On-the-job search, however, has a negligible impact outside recessionary
periods.
5.7 Hazard Rate of Exiting Unemployment
Due to the heterogeneity in job finding rates amongst unemployed workers,
the model generates the negative duration dependence in the unemployment exit
rate that comes purely from the changing composition in the stocks of unem-
ployment.37 At longer unemployment durations, the stocks of unemployment are
more represented by those with lower exit rates (the insured unemployed with
higher UI benefits in this case). Moreover, the strength of the duration depen-
dence is positively correlated with the state of the economy as pointed out in
Wiczer (2015). Figure 16 shows the hazard rates of exiting unemployment for
December 2007 (maximum 26 weeks of UI) and June 2010 (maximum 90 weeks
of UI). The negative duration dependence is more severe with and persists as long
as the UI extensions themselves. Empirical results based on Kroft et al. (2016)
and Wiczer (2015) suggest that the hazard rate is stable after 6 months of being
unemployed. In the model, however, since uninsured unemployed workers exit
37The duration-dependent unemployment exit rate is a featured result in several studies in-
cluding Clark and Summers (1979), Machin and Manning (1999), and Elsby, Hobijn, S¸ahin and
Valletta (2011).
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unemployment at a faster rate than do the insured, the hazard rate rises upon the
exhaustion of UI benefits.38
To study the role of unobserved heterogeneity, I estimated the same non-linear
state space model in Ahn and Hamilton (2019). They find that the unobserved
heterogeneity of workers (in terms of unemployment exit rate) contribute to the
rise in unemployment duration during the Great Recession. I can relate their
interpretation of unobserved heterogeneity to the UI status in my model as the
insured unemployed have a lower unemployment exit rate than the uninsured. I
find little differences in the unemployment exit rate based on the heterogeneous
worker productivity. I describe in full the state space model, the estimation and
the results in Appendix E and F.
6 Conclusion
This paper quantifies the impact of endogenous UI extensions on the dynamics
of unemployment and its duration structure which have an important implication
on the recovery of the aggregate labour market. I develop a general equilibrium
search and matching model where the maximum UI duration depends on the un-
employment rate, and the UI benefits depend on the match quality during em-
ployment. Workers are heterogeneous and their job search effort depend on their
characteristics as well as the maximum UI duration.
I find that the generous UI extensions during the Great Recession contribute
to 10-30% of the rise of unemployment. Both the microeconomic and general
equilibrium effects of UI are important and the former is consistent with exist-
ing empirical estimates. The UI effect on long-term unemployment is, however,
much larger as it contributes up to 90% of its rise where the microeconomic effect
of UI is most responsible. That said, the UI effect is non-linear as its magnitude
is smaller in the early 1990s recession. I also show that disregarding rational ex-
pectations about the timings of UI extensions implies a significant overestimation
of the UI effects on unemployment and its duration.
38The heterogeneity in worker productivity could potentially explain the negative duration de-
pendence after the UI exhaustion since type-H workers exit unemployment at a faster rate. How-
ever, despite this heterogeneity, the exit rates of both types (H and L) when uninsured are similar
and much higher than when insured which leaves the average exit rate after UI exhaustion rather
stable. In order to fit the empirical results better, other heterogeneity amongst uninsured unem-
ployed workers could be introduced such as different values of home production, or even a larger
degree of heterogeneity in productivity.
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Figure 1: Unemployment and Long-term Unemployment (those unemployed > 6
months) in the US (Source: CPS)
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Figure 2: Maximum Unemployment Insurance Duration (weeks) in the US
(Source: ETA. Shaded areas denote the recessions. Dashed green line denotes
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Figure 3: Shares (%) of Current UI Recipients in 2 Subgroups: Long-term Un-
employment and Newly Unemployed Workers (Source: CPS)
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Figure 4: Aggregate Productivity Series (z) as Constructed to Match Output De-
viations from HP Trend
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Figure 5: UI Extensions from the Model and the Data (Data source: ETA)
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Figure 6: Unemployment Rate (%): Model and Data (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 7: Long-term Unemployment Rate (%): Model and Data (Data source:
CPS)
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Figure 8: Average Unemployment Duration: Model and Data (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 9: Distribution of Unemployment Durations during the Great Recession
(Data source: CPS)
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Figure 10: Unemployment Shares (%) by Durations (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 11: Job Finding Rate: Model vs. Data (left panel) and the Model’s Job
Finding Rate by UI Status (right panel) (%) (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 12: Unemployment (left) and long-term unemployment (right) when using
the average maximum potential UI duration across states (average max UI dur.)
and the maximum UI duration (max of max UI dur.) (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 13: Conditional Job finding rate (top panels) and Total Match Surplus
(bottom panels) by UI status {e,UI,UU} (left panels) and benefit levels (m˜) (right
panels): For solid (dashed) lines, maximum UI duration is 39 (90) weeks. UI is
extended when u> 6.5%.
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Figure 14: Decomposition of the effect of UI extensions on long-term Unemploy-
ment, total unemployment and average unemployment duration: Data, baseline
model, and counterfactuals (where each channel does not respond to UI exten-
sions) (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 15: Job Separation Rates from the Start of each Recession (Data source:
CPS, NBER)
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Note: TGR is for the Great Recession. The starting date of each recession is
based on NBER. The series in the right panel is detrended using HP filter.
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Figure 16: Hazard Rate (%) of Exiting Unemployment
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Table 1: Monthly Transition Rate (%)
Current UI Recipients Non-UI Recipients
Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp. Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp.
UE 21.4 7.2 −14.2 27.5 17.8 −9.7
UU 68.4 84.4 +16.0 48.0 60.2 +12.2
UOLF 10.3 8.5 −1.8 24.5 22.0 −2.5
• U : Unemployment, E : Employment, OLF : Out of labour force. ∆pp. ≡
change in rate (in pp.) from January 2008 to January 2010. Data source:
CPS.
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Table 2: Targeted Moments
Moment Data Model S.E.
E(u) 0.0583 0.0577 (0.0095)
E(ρUE) 0.4194 0.4286 (0.0198)
E(ρEU ) 0.0248 0.0251 (0.0002)
E(ρEE) 0.0320 0.0320 (0.0096)
E(udur) 14.116 13.063 (1.2420)
E(uUI) 0.0290 0.0327 (0.0079)
std(u) 0.1454 0.1453 (0.0194)
std(ρUE) 0.0999 0.1402 (0.0138)
std(ρEU ) 0.0890 0.0641 (0.0102)
std(udur) 6.9327 6.1954 (0.5806)
std(LP) 0.0131 0.0104 (0.0003)
corr(LP,LP−1) 0.7612 0.7593 (0.0181)
• ρUE : job finding rate. ρEU : job separation rate. ρEE : job-to-job transition
rate. udur: mean unemployment duration (weeks). LP = y/(1−u): labour
productivity. Data source: CPS
Table 3: Fixed Parameters For Baseline Model
Parameter Description Value Sources/Remarks
β Discount factor 0.9967 Annual interest rate of 4%
κ Vacancy posting cost 0.0392 Fujita & Ramey (2012)
µ Worker’s bargaining power 0.5 Den Haan, Ramey & Watson (2000)
φH UI exhaustion rate 1/6 6 months max UI duration, ETA
φL1 UI exhaustion rate 1/9 9 months max UI duration, ETA
φL2 UI exhaustion rate 1/12 12 months max UI duration, ETA
φL3 UI exhaustion rate 1/16 16 months max UI duration, ETA
φL4 UI exhaustion rate 1/21 21 months max UI duration, ETA
u¯ UI policy threshold 0.065 ETA
au Search cost function 0.1116 Normalisation
du,de Search cost function 1 Christensen et al. (2004), Yashiv (2000)
h Leisure flow 0.5835 Gruber (1997)
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Table 4: Values of UI benefits by match quality in most recent employment
and worker’s productivity
m10 m20 m30 m40 m50 m60 m70 m80 m90 m100
bH(m) 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.028 0.043 0.064 0.077 0.104 0.130 0.296
bL(m) 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.027 0.042 0.062 0.076 0.103 0.129 0.295
m 0.526 0.563 0.618 0.655 0.692 0.748 0.785 0.859 0.933 1.396
• mx is the x-th percentile of the match quality distribution F(m)
Table 5: Calibrated Parameters For Baseline Model
Parameter Description Value
l Meeting function 0.51
δ Exogenous separation rate 0.023
λ Pr(redrawing new m) 0.50
ψ Pr(losing UI after becoming unemployed) 0.49
ξ Pr(losing UI after meeting firm) 0.50
ae Search cost function 0.15
m Lowest match-specific productivity 0.396
β1 Match-specific prod. distribution 2.55
β2 Match-specific prod. distribution 5.26
ρz Persistence of TFP 0.9562
σz Standard deviation of TFP shocks 0.0075
ηL Productivity of type-L 0.985
Table 6: Moments Not Targeted
Moment Data Model S.E.
E(U1) 0.0233 0.0237 (0.0007)
E(U2) 0.0172 0.0180 (0.0014)
E(U4) 0.0080 0.0085 (0.0017)
E(LTU) 0.0098 0.0076 (0.0058)
std(U1) 0.0048 0.0017 (0.0005)
std(U2) 0.0046 0.0030 (0.0009)
std(U4) 0.0035 0.0035 (0.0012)
std(LTU) 0.0085 0.0107 (0.0057)
std(uUI) 0.1780 0.2523 (0.0236)
std(v) 0.1226 0.0506 (0.0029)
corr(u,v) -0.8786 -0.2160 (0.0241)
• U1: Unemployed less than 1 month. U2: Unemployed with 2-3 month
duration. U4: Unemployed with 4-6 month duration. LTU : Unemployed
longer 6 months. udur: mean unemployment duration (weeks). Data source:
CPS
38
Table 7: Effects of Eliminating UI Extensions During Recessions
Change from baseline
Micro Effect of UI Total Effect of UI
Data Baseline ∆φ ∆(φ ,s) ∆(φ ,s,S)
The Great Recession (From 90 weeks to 26 weeks of UI)
max(u) (%) 10.0% 9.8% −0.9pp −1.8pp −2.9pp
max(udur) (weeks) 40.6 37.6 −23.3 −25 −25.6
max(LTU) (%) 4.4% 4.7% −3.7pp −4.1pp −4.2pp
The Early 1990s Recession (From 68 weeks to 26 weeks of UI)
max(u) (%) 7.8% 7.8% −0.6pp −1.2pp −1.5pp
max(udur) (weeks) 20 24 −11.1 −12.2 −12.3
max(LTU) (%) 1.7% 2.6% −2pp −2.2pp −2.2pp
• ∆φ : UI exhaustion rate changes. ∆(φ ,s): UI exhaustion rate and job search
behaviour change. ∆(φ ,s,S): UI exhaustion rate, job search behaviour,
match separations, and match formations change. LTU : Unemployed
longer 6 months. udur: mean unemployment duration. These statistics are
computed between October 2009 (the peak of the US unemployment rate)
and June 2014 for the Great Recession and between July 1990 and June
1996 for the Early 1990s Recession. Data source: CPS
Table 8: Counterfactual Experiments during the Great Recession
Data Baseline No Reachback No Rational Exp. No OJS
max(u) (%) 10.0% 9.8% −0.1pp +2.3pp −0.5pp
max(udur) (weeks) 40.6 37.6 −0.1 +3.8 −1.1
max(LTU) (%) 4.4% 4.7% −0.1pp +2.1pp −0.4pp
• LTU : Unemployed longer 6 months. udur: mean unemployment duration
(weeks). These statistics are computed between October 2009 (the peak of
the US unemployment rate) and June 2014. Data source: CPS
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A Further Tables (For Online Publication)
Table A.1: Unemployment-to-Employment (UE) Monthly Transition Rate
(%)
Current UI Recipients Non-UI Recipients
Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp. Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp.
Age
16 years or older 21.4 7.2 −14.2 27.5 17.8 −9.7
25−54 years 24.3 7.1 −17.1 30.7 19.7 −11.0
Gender
Male 24.9 7.2 −17.6 28.4 18.3 −10.1
Female 16.3 7.2 −9.1 26.3 17.1 −9.2
Education
Less than High School 25.0 4.7 −20.3 25.4 16.2 −9.2
High School 9.0 7.5 −1.5 28.9 16.0 −12.9
Some College 27.4 7.4 −20.0 28.0 20.5 −7.5
College or higher 26.8 7.4 −19.3 28.4 24.5 −3.9
Industry
Manufacturing 22.5 6.5 −16.0 25.6 14.9 −10.7
Construction 18.3 9.6 −8.7 36.3 21.6 −14.7
Wholesale & Retail n/a 6.4 n/a 26.0 16.3 −9.7
Prof./Business Services 45.9 4.3 −41.6 22.5 19.9 −2.6
Occupation
High-skilled 27.4 7.8 −19.5 27.4 24.6 −2.9
Middle-skilled 18.6 6.6 −12.0 30.1 17.9 −12.2
Low-skilled 20.6 10.4 −10.2 26.6 17.6 −9.0
Reasons for Unemployment
Temporary Layoff 50.7 12.2 −38.5 46.2 40.4 −5.8
Permanent Separation 13.6 6.7 −6.9 25.6 15.6 −10.0
Recall
Date Given 56.4 9.9 −46.5 53.9 47.00 −6.9
No Date Given 22.4 7.7 −14.7 29.4 22.9 −6.5
Some indication 48.3 13.3 −35.0 36.6 33.8 −2.8
No indication 16.5 7.0 −9.5 22.2 17.5 −4.7
• Data source: CPS. ∆pp. ≡ change in UE rate (in percentage points) =
UEJan10−UEJan08. Occupation skills are defined as in the job polarisation
literature (where high-, middle-, and low-skilled occupations respectively
are abstract, routine, and manual jobs)
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Table A.2: Unemployment-to-Unemployment (UU) Monthly Transition Rate
(%)
Current UI Recipients Non-UI Recipients
Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp. Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp.
Age
16 years or older 68.4 84.4 +16.0 48.0 60.2 +12.2
25−54 years 65.4 84.9 +19.6 50.8 62.6 +11.8
Gender
Male 62.5 85.5 +23.0 50.9 63.0 +12.1
Female 77.0 81.9 +4.9 43.9 56.0 +12.1
Education
Less than High School 60.7 82.4 +21.7 43.8 58.1 +14.3
High School 77.6 87.8 +10.2 49.8 63.2 +13.4
Some College 65.1 81.7 +16.6 49.3 58.8 +9.5
College or higher 61.1 81.2 +20.1 51.7 60.4 +8.8
Industry
Manufacturing 68.2 82.0 +13.8 51.9 62.6 +10.7
Construction 65.6 84.4 +18.8 50.5 66.5 +16.0
Wholesale & Retail 80.9 86.1 +5.2 49.5 60.1 +10.6
Prof./Business Services 52.5 88.9 +36.3 55.5 60.2 +4.7
Occupation
High-skilled 68.5 86.1 +17.6 49.8 60.7 +10.9
Middle-skilled 69.1 83.9 +14.8 48.3 62.3 +14.0
Low-skilled 62.9 81.0 +18.1 47.8 55.8 +8.0
Reasons for Unemployment
Temporary Layoff 36.2 81.1 +44.9 42.2 49.5 +7.2
Permanent Separation 78.5 84.5 +6.0 57.2 69.1 +11.9
Recall
Date Given 28.5 81.4 +52.9 35.9 47.0 +11.1
No Date Given 68.7 84.0 +15.3 52.6 63.5 +11.0
Some indication 39.5 80.9 +41.4 50.2 52.4 +2.2
No indication 77.6 84.3 +6.8 55.2 69.1 +13.9
• Data source: CPS
∆pp. ≡ change in UU rate (in percentage points) =UUJan10−UUJan08
Occupation skills are defined as in the job polarisation literature (where
high-, middle-, and low-skilled occupations respectively are abstract, rou-
tine, and manual jobs)
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Table A.3: Unemployment-to-Out-of-Labour-Force (UOLF) Monthly Tran-
sition Rate (%)
Current UI Recipients Non-UI Recipients
Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp. Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp.
Age
16 years or older 10.3 8.5 −1.8 24.5 22.0 −2.5
25−54 years 10.4 8.0 −2.4 18.5 17.7 −0.8
Gender
Male 12.6 7.3 −5.4 20.7 18.7 −2.0
Female 6.8 10.9 +4.1 29.8 26.8 −3.0
Education
Less than High School 14.3 12.9 −1.4 30.8 25.7 −5.1
High School 13.4 4.6 −8.7 21.3 20.8 −0.5
Some College 7.5 11.0 +3.5 22.7 20.7 −2.0
College or higher 12.1 11.3 −0.8 19.9 15.1 −4.8
Industry
Manufacturing 9.3 11.6 +2.3 22.5 22.5 0.0
Construction 16.1 5.9 −10.2 13.2 11.9 −1.3
Wholesale & Retail 19.1 7.5 −11.6 24.4 23.6 −0.8
Prof./Business Services 1.5 6.8 +5.3 22.0 19.9 −2.1
Occupation
High-skilled 4.1 6.0 +1.9 22.8 14.8 −8.0
Middle-skilled 12.3 9.5 −2.8 21.7 19.9 −1.8
Low-skilled 16.5 8.6 −7.9 25.6 26.6 +1.0
Reasons for Unemployment
Temporary Layoff 13.2 6.7 −6.4 11.6 10.2 −1.4
Permanent Separation 7.9 8.8 +0.9 17.2 15.3 −1.9
Recall
Date Given 15.1 8.6 −6.5 10.2 6.1 −4.1
No Date Given 8.9 8.3 −0.6 18.0 13.6 −4.4
Some indication 12.3 5.8 −6.5 13.2 13.8 +0.56
No indication 6.0 8.7 +2.7 22.6 13.4 −9.2
• Data source: CPS
∆pp. ≡ change in UOLF rate (in percentage points) = UOLFJan10 −
UOLFJan08
Occupation skills are defined as in the job polarisation literature (where
high-, middle-, and low-skilled occupations respectively are abstract, rou-
tine, and manual jobs)
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Table A.4: Fraction (%) of Long-term Unemployment Represented by Cur-
rent UI Recipients in each Subgroup
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14 ∆pp. from
2008 to 2010
Age
16 years or older 18 15 51 39 16 +36
25-54 years 18 14 50 41 18 +36
Gender
Male 15 13 50 38 14 +38
Female 22 18 54 40 19 +36
Education
Less than High School 13 23 34 32 12 +11
High School 21 2 53 34 14 +51
Some College 17 21 56 44 17 +35
College or higher 22 22 56 40 22 +34
Industry
Manufacturing 27 25 62 38 17 +37
Construction 8 16 47 40 21 +31
Wholesale & Retail 6 n/a 53 34 18 n/a
Prof./Business Services 13 11 43 35 6 +32
Occupation
High-skilled 29 22 61 46 27 +39
Middle-skilled 14 15 53 39 12 +38
Low-skilled 11 6 29 30 14 +23
Reasons for Unemployment
Temporary Layoff n/a 30 61 49 12 +31
Permanent Separation 22 18 56 41 17 +38
Recall
Date Given n/a n/a 42 63 10 n/a
No Date Given 15 26 60 46 26 +34
Some indication n/a 5 68 43 12 +63
No indication 16 29 60 46 27 +31
• Data source: CPS
Long-term unemployment is defined as unemployed workers whose dura-
tion is longer than six months.
Occupation skills are defined as in the job polarisation literature (where
high-, middle-, and low-skilled occupations respectively are abstract, rou-
tine, and manual jobs)
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Table A.5: Fraction (%) of Newly Unemployed Workers Represented by Cur-
rent UI Recipients in each Subgroup
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14 ∆pp. from
2008 to 2010
Age
16 years or older 23 21 41 30 25 +20
25-54 years 24 21 42 33 31 +21
Gender
Male 26 20 40 33 27 +20
Female 18 23 42 26 21 +19
Education
Less than High School 23 18 25 28 8 +7
High School 29 17 48 27 33 +30
Some College 16 26 41 33 26 +14
College or higher 18 24 46 33 30 +22
Industry
Manufacturing 45 30 44 36 31 +15
Construction 33 17 44 45 32 +27
Wholesale & Retail 25 21 51 20 24 +30
Prof./Business Services 13 19 26 33 22 +7
Occupation
High-skilled 22 24 55 34 30 +31
Middle-skilled 26 18 41 36 25 +23
Low-skilled 6 30 22 12 18 −8
Reasons for Unemployment
Temporary Layoff 34 25 44 27 31 +19
Permanent Separation 25 21 47 33 28 +26
Recall
Date Given 25 25 49 23 24 +24
No Date Given 32 30 49 34 36 +20
Some indication 39 26 42 31 40 +16
No indication 28 31 51 34 35 +19
• Data source: CPS
Newly unemployed workers are defined as unemployed workers whose du-
ration is less than five weeks.
Occupation skills are defined as in the job polarisation literature (where
high-, middle-, and low-skilled occupations respectively are abstract, rou-
tine, and manual jobs)
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B Expressions for Optimal Search Intensity and Match
Surplus
Given the worker’s value functions when employed, insured unemployed and
uninsured unemployed, we can take the first derivative to find the optimal search
effort. The first order conditions for type-i workers are as follows
ν ′e(s
e
i (m;ω)) = −β (1−δ )M(θ(ω))Eω ′|ω
[
... (B.1)
(1−λ )(1−F(m))
(
WSe(m)+i (m;ω
′)−Em′|m′>m[WSe(m)+i (m′;ω ′)]
)
+ λEm′
[
(1−F(m′))(WSe(m)+i (m′;ω ′)−Em′′|m′′>m′[WSe(m)+i (m′′;ω ′)])
]]
ν ′u(s
UI
i (m,ω)) = βM(θ(ω))Em′ω ′|ω
[
max{WSUI(m)i (m′;ω ′),0}−ξ (1−φ(u))USi(m,ω ′)
]
(B.2)
ν ′u(s
UU
i (ω)) = βM(θ(ω))Em′ω ′|ω
[
max{WSUUi (m′;ω ′),0}
]
(B.3)
Total match surpluses and unemployed worker’s surplus are as follows
Se(m˜)i (m;ω) = yi(m,ω)−νe(sei (m;ω))− τ(ω)− (1−ψ)(bi(m˜)+h−νu(sUI(m˜)i (ω)))
−ψ(h−νu(sUUi (ω)))+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m)))Se(m)+i (m;ω ′)...
+pei (m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[µSe(m)+i (m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Se(m)+i (m′;ω ′)...
+pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′))Em′′|m′′>m′[µSe(m)+i (m′′;ω ′)]
]
−(1−ψ)pUI(m˜)i (ω)Em′[µSUI(m˜)+i (m′;ω ′)]
−ψ pUUi (ω)Em′[µSUU+i (m′;ω ′)]
+(1−ψ)
(
USi(m,ω ′)−USi(m˜,ω ′)...
+(φ(u)+ pUI(m˜)i (ω)ξ (1−φ(u)))USi(m˜,ω ′)
)]
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SUI(m˜)i (m;ω) = yi(m,ω)−νe(sei (m;ω))− τ
−(1−φ)(1−ξ )(b(m˜)+h−νu(sUI(m˜)i (ω)))
−(1− (1−φ)(1−ξ ))(h−νu(sUUi (ω)))+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m)))Se(m)+i (m;ω ′)...
+pei (m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[µSe(m)+i (m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Se(m)+i (m′;ω ′)...
+pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′))Em′′|m′′>m′[µSe(m)+i (m′′;ω ′)]
]
−(1−φ)(1−ξ )pUI(m˜)i (ω)Em′[µSUI(m˜)+i (m′;ω ′)]
−
(
1− (1−φ)(1−ξ )
)
pUUi (ω)Em′[µS
UU+
i (m
′;ω ′)]
+(1−ψ)USi(m,ω ′)
−
(
(1−φ)2(1−ξ )(1−ξ pUI(m˜)i (ω))
)
USi(m˜,ω ′)
]
SUUi (m;ω) = yi(m,ω)−νe(sei (m;ω))− τ− (h−νu(sUUi (ω)))+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m)))Se(m)+i (m;ω ′)...
+pei (m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[µSe(m)+i (m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Se(m)+i (m′;ω ′)...
+pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′))Em′′|m′′>m′[µSe(m)+i (m′′;ω ′)]
]
−pUUi (ω)Em′[µSUU+i (m′;ω ′)]
+(1−ψ)USi(m,ω ′)
]
USi(m,ω) = b(m)−νu(sUI(m)i (ω))+νu(sUUi (ω))
+βEω ′|ω
[
pUI(m)i (ω)Em′[µS
UI(m)+
i (m
′;ω ′)]...
−pUUi (ω)Em′[µSUU+i (m′;ω ′)]
+(1−φ)
(
1−ξ pUI(m)i (ω)
)
USi(m,ω ′)
]
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C Transitions
Employment The mass of type-i employed agents in t with match quality m,
ei,t(m), evolves as follows
ei,t+1(m) = (1−δ )(1−λ )(1− pei,t(m)+ pei,t(m)F(m))ei,t(m)1{Se(m)i,t+1(m)> 0}
+(1−δ )(1−λ ) f (m)
∫
m′<m
pei,t(m
′)ei,t(m′)1{Se(m
′)
i,t+1(m)> 0}dm′
+(1−δ )λ f (m)
∫
m′
(1− pei,t(m′)+ pei,t(m′)F(m))ei,t(m′)1{Se(m
′)
i,t+1(m)> 0}dm′
+(1−δ )λF(m) f (m)
∫
m′
pei,t(m
′)ei,t(m′)1{Se(m
′)
i,t+1(m)> 0}dm′
+ f (m)
∫
m˜
uUIi,t (m˜)p
UI
i,t (m˜)1{SUI(m˜)i,t+1 (m)> 0}dm˜
+ f (m)uUUi,t p
UU
i,t 1{SUUi,t+1(m)> 0} (C.1)
where 1{·} is an indicator function. The total employment is the sum of all em-
ployed workers over productivity types and match qualities et =∑i=H,L
∫
ei,t(m) dm,
and the aggregate output can be computed as yt = zt∑i=H,L
∫
m · ei,t(m) dm.
Job Destructions The job destruction rate of type-i employed workers with
match quality m at the beginning of period t and m′ at the end of period t and the
average job destruction rate are respectively
ρx,it(m,m′) =
δ if S
e(m)
i,t+1(m
′)> 0,
1 otherwise
ρx,it =
(
δ
∫ ∫
{(m,m′):Se(m)i,t+1(m′)>0}
eposti,t (m,m
′)dm dm′
+
∫ ∫
{(m,m′):Se(m)i,t+1(m′)≤0}
eposti,t (m,m
′)dm dm′
)
/et (C.2)
where eposti,t (m,m
′) = (1−λ )(1− pei,t(m′)+ pei,t(m′)F(m′))ei,t(m′)
+(1−λ ) f (m′)pei,t(m)ei,t(m)1{m< m′}
+λ f (m′)(1− pei,t(m)+ pei,t(m)F(m′))ei,t(m)
+λF(m′) f (m′)pei,t(m)ei,t(m)
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denotes employed workers with match productivity m at the beginning of period
t and m′ at the end of the period t.
Job Findings The job finding rate for a type-i unemployed worker of status
j = {UI(m˜),UU} and the average job finding rate are respectively
ρ jf ,it =
∫
ρ jf ,it(m) f (m)dm
ρ f ,t =
∫
m˜ u
UI
i,t (m˜)ρ
UI(m˜)
f ,it dm˜+u
UU
i,t ρ
UU
f ,it∫
m˜ u
UI
t (m˜)dm˜+uUUt
where ρ jf ,it(m) =
p
j
i,t if S
j
i,t+1(m)> 0,
0 otherwise
Job-to-job Transitions The match-specific and the average job-to-job transi-
tion rates are respectively
ρeei,t (m) = (1−δ )
(
(1−λ )pei,t(m)(1−F(m))Em′>m[1{Sei,t+1(m,m′)> 0}]
+λ
∫
m′
pei,t(m) f (m
′)(1−F(m′))Em′′>m′[1{Sei,t+1(m,m′′)> 0}]dm′
)
ρeei,t =
∫
mρeei,t (m)ei,t(m)dm
et
Unemployment The mass of type-i unemployed workers with and without UI
benefits as well as the total unemployment evolve respectively as follows
uUIi,t+1(m˜) = (1−φt)(1− pUIi,t (m˜))uUIi,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unmatched, not losing UI
+χUIi,t (m˜)(1−φt)(1−ξ )pUIi,t (m˜)uUIi,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad match, not losing UI
+(1−ψ)
∫
m′
ρx,it(m˜,m′)ei,t(m˜,m′)dm′︸ ︷︷ ︸
destroyed match, not losing UI
(C.3)
uUUi,t+1 =
∫
m˜
(
φt(1− pUIi,t (m˜))uUIi,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unmatched, losing UI
+χUIi,t (m˜)
(
φt+(1−φt)ξ
)
pUIi,t (m˜)u
UI
i,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad match, losing UI
)
dm˜
+(1−ρUUf ,it )uUUi,t + ψρx,itei,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
destroyed match, losing UI
(C.4)
ut+1 = ∑
i=H,L
(∫
m˜
uUIi,t+1(m˜)dm˜+u
UU
i,t+1
)
(C.5)
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where χUIi,t (m˜)≡
∫
1{SUIi,t+1(m˜,m)≤ 0} f (m)dm denotes the rate the newly formed
matches with uUIi (m˜) are not viable.
D Performance of the Approximation Method
Table D.1 reports the average percentage deviations (in modulus) of the first
four moments of the approximated distribution of employed workers over match
quality, employment history, and individual productivity. This approximated dis-
tribution is on average less than 1% different in terms of the 1st, 2nd, and 4th
moments from the simulated distributions. The 3rd moment is however more
than 3% different from the simulation which is mainly due to the different cut-off
points in the distributions coming from the endogenous job separations.
Table D.1: Performance of the Approximation Method
Percentage deviations (%)
Mean SE
1st moment 0.4762 0.3512
2nd moment 0.3164 0.4641
3rd moment 3.5648 3.324
4th moment 0.1982 0.2564
E On the Sources of Long-term Unemployment (For
Online Publication)
In this section I first show how consistent the model’s unemployment series
are with the empirical data by estimating a non-linear state space model in Ahn
and Hamilton (2019) using the model’s generated data. Then I study the impli-
cations on the sources of long-term unemployment. They explore the roles of
worker’s unobserved heterogeneity on unemployment dynamics. Their interpre-
tation is that there are two types of workers: type-H workers have an ex-ante
higher rate of exiting unemployment than do type-L workers. They also allow
for genuine duration dependence that could be positive (motivational effect) and
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negative (scarring effect). The measurements or observables in their model are
unemployment series by 5 duration bins {u1t ,u2.3t ,u4.6t ,u7.12t ,u13+t } which are, re-
spectively, unemployed workers with duration less than 1 month, 2-3 months, 4-6
months, 7-12 months, and more than 12 months. The latent or hidden states are
also time varying. They are the number of newly unemployed workers for each
type and a factor governing the unemployment continuation probability for each
type. I summarise their state space model in Appendix F.
I obtain 50 different series of {u1t ,u2.3t ,u4.6t , u7.12t ,u13+t } using the Monte Carlo
simulations from the baseline model. For each set of the simulated unemployment
series, I use Maximum Likelihood to obtain a set of (twelve) estimates from the
state space model as described in Appendix F. The extended Kalman filter is used
to construct the likelihood function since some latent variables enter the equations
for unemployment series non-linearly. Table F.1 reports these estimates and their
standard errors.
Overall, the model’s estimates are consistent with the empirical ones in Ahn
and Hamilton (2019). Based on these estimated parameters, I construct the se-
ries for (1) the probability that newly unemployed workers of each type stay
unemployed the following month, (2) the number of newly unemployed work-
ers of each type, and (3) the share of unemployment by each type. Comparisons
between these series and their empirical counterparts from Ahn and Hamilton
(2019) are shown in Figures E.1, E.2, and E.3 respectively.
The probabilities that the newly unemployed workers stay unemployed in the
following month from the model’s estimates (Figure E.1) exhibit more volatility
over the business cycles especially for type-L workers. Nonetheless, during the
Great Recession, the model’s data implies the rise of this probability for type-L
workers and a small drop for type-H workers similar to its empirical counterpart.
Going back to the model’s results, we can see from the right panel of Figure 11
in the manuscript that they complement well with the results from this estimation
where the insured unemployed workers (the type with “lower” exit rate) have a
much more volatile unemployment exit rate than the uninsured (the type with
“higher” exit rate).
With respect to the number of newly unemployed during the Great Recession
(Figure E.2), the model’s estimates also imply a spike of the inflow of type-L
workers (and a much smaller rise for type-H) with similar magnitude to the em-
pirical counterpart. However, since the UI status of newly unemployed workers
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in the model is governed solely by the poisson rate ψ , the series for the newly
unemployed workers who are insured and uninsured are perfectly correlated and
therefore do not complement the results in Figure E.2. The series only differ
as the workers remain unemployed which is related to Figure E.3, showing the
shares of total unemployment by unobserved types. The model’s implied share
has very similar dynamics to the data throughout the observed periods. However,
the share of type-L workers does not show a clear negative trend like in Ahn and
Hamilton (2019), but this is expected since the model does not account for any
low frequency changes or a trend e.g. in the unemployment rate or the job finding
rate. Figure E.4 shows the model’s shares of total unemployment by UI status
and worker’s productivity. It can be seen that the rise in the share of type-L work-
ers from the estimation (Figure E.3) has more similar dynamics to the share of
the insured unemployed workers in the model (rather than the share of the low
productivity workers which exhibits smaller fluctuations).
Figure E.5 shows the implied unemployment continuation probabilities from
the true duration dependence component which are similar to the empirical esti-
mates. This probability is rather constant in the first 6 months of duration, and
then it increases during 6-12 months of unemployment implying a scarring ef-
fect. After 12 months of unemployment, it is more likely that a worker exits
unemployment the longer she stays unemployed . These estimates are somewhat
consistent with the model’s hazard rate of exiting unemployment (Figure 16) dis-
cussed in subsection 5.7 of the manuscript. As the UI benefits run out, workers
search harder for jobs and exit unemployment more quickly. The change in the
job search behaviour (and therefore the hazard rate) depends on the maximum
UI duration, but we can observe that in the 1976-2014 periods (upon which the
observations are based) the maximum UI duration during recessions is at least 12
months which is consistent with a fall in the probability of remaining unemployed
after 12 months.
In summary, the model’s unemployment series are consistent with the empir-
ical data as estimated using a state space model. I can relate Ahn and Hamilton
(2019)’s interpretation of worker unobserved heterogeneity to the UI statuses of
unemployed workers in my model since the insured unemployed have a lower
unemployment exit rate than do the uninsured. They have similar dynamics in
terms of the unemployment exit rate as well as the shares of total unemployment.
Moreover, some feature of the genuine duration dependence in the job finding
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Figure E.1: Probability that the newly unemployed workers of each type remain
unemployed the following month: model’s prediction (left panel) and empirical
prediction from Ahn & Hamilton (2019) (right panel, source: Ahn & Hamilton,
2019)
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rate can also be related to the UI exhaustion in the model.
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Figure E.2: Number of newly unemployed workers of each type: model’s pre-
diction (left panel) and empirical prediction from Ahn & Hamilton (2019) (right
panel, source: Ahn & Hamilton, 2019)
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Figure E.3: Share of unemployment by worker’s type: model’s prediction (left
panel) and empirical prediction from Ahn & Hamilton (2019) (right panel, source:
Ahn & Hamilton, 2019)
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Figure E.4: Shares (%) of unemployment by UI Status and Worker’s Productivity
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Figure E.5: Implied Unemployment Continuation Probability from Genuine Du-
ration Dependence: model’s prediction (solid) and empirical prediction from Ahn
& Hamilton (2019) (dashed)
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• Note: The time varying factors governing the outflow rates for type-i work-
ers (xit) are normalised to zero when calculating these probabilities.
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F Ahn and Hamilton (2019)’s State Space Model
(For Online Publication)
To summarise briefly, Ahn and Hamilton (2019)’s state space model contains
the latent variables which are the number of each type entering unemployment
in each time period (wH,t ,wL,t) and the time-varying factors governing their out-
flow rates (xH,t ,xL,t). These four variables follow a random walk process. For
example, wH,t = wH,t−1 + εwH,t . The errors are independently and normally dis-
tributed with mean zero and standard deviation {σwH ,σwL ,σ xH ,σ xL} respectively.
They assume the true duration dependence of unemployment exit rate is time in-
variant and summarised by {δ1,δ2,δ3}. The measurements or observables in their
model are unemployment series by 5 duration bins {u1t ,u2.3t ,u4.6t ,u7.12t ,u13+t }.
They are, respectively, unemployed workers with duration less than 1 month, 2-3
months, 4-6 months, 7-12 months, and more than 12 months. All five unemploy-
ment series can contain measurement errors {r1t ,r2.3t ,r4.6t ,r7.12t ,r13+t } which are
independently and normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation
{R1,R2.3,R4.6,R7.12,R13+}. The evolution of these series are as follows
u1t = ∑
i=H,L
wit+ r1t
u2.3t = ∑
i=H,L
[wi,t−1Pit(1)+wi,t−2Pit(2)]+ r2.3t
u4.6t = ∑
i=H,L
5
∑
k=3
[wi,t−kPit(k)]+ r4.6t
u7.12t = ∑
i=H,L
11
∑
k=6
[wi,t−kPit(k)]+ r7.12t
u13+t = ∑
i=H,L
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∑
k=12
[wi,t−kPit(k)]+ r13+t
where Pit( j) = pi,t− j+1(1)× pi,t− j+2(2)× ...× pi,t( j)
pit(τ) = exp[−exp(xit+dτ)]
dτ =

δ1(τ−1) for τ < 6
δ1[(6−1)−1]+δ2[τ− (6−1)] for 6≤ τ < 12
δ1[(6−1)−1]+δ2[(12−1)− (6−1)]+δ3[τ− (12−1)] for 12≤ τ
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The parameters to be estimated are the standard deviations of the errors {σwH ,σwL ,σ xH ,σ xL,
R1,R2.3,R4.6,R7.12,R13+} and the parameters for true duration dependence
{δ1,δ2,δ3}. I obtain 50 different series of {u1t ,u2.3t ,u4.6t , u7.12t ,u13+t } by using the
Monte Carlo simulations. For each set of the simulated unemployment series, I
obtain a set of twelve estimates from the same non-linear state space model us-
ing Maximum Likelihood. The extended Kalman filter is used to construct the
likelihood function since {xH,t ,xL,t} enter the equations for unemployment series
non-linearly. Table F.1 reports these estimates and their standard errors.
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Table F.1: Parameter Estimates from State Space Model in Ahn and Hamil-
ton (2019)
Parameter A&H (2016) Model
σwL 0.0434 0.0439
(0.0041) (0.0086)
σwH 0.0456 0.0487
(0.0059) (0.0060)
σ xL 0.0446 0.0469
(0.0049) (0.0096)
σ xH 0.0209 0.0211
(0.0028) (0.0030)
δ1 0.0053 0.0055
(0.0138) (0.0010)
δ2 -0.0647 -0.0283
(0.0242) (0.0383)
δ3 0.0724 0.0981
(0.0250) (0.0231)
R1 0.0981 0.0966
(0.0058) (0.0156)
R2.3 0.0759 0.0755
(0.0043) (0.0111)
R4.6 0.0775 0.0765
(0.0068) (0.0123)
R7.12 0.0597 0.0626
(0.0051) (0.0080)
R13+ 0.0366 0.0390
(0.0026) (0.0057)
• Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Please refer to Appendix E for
variables’ definitions
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